Frank Douglas Heath
Whither
Somaliland?
Comments
on the Self-Portrait
The Self-Portrait* describes what happens when a profoundly tribal
society tries to introduce democracy. The government that was created for
Somaliland is described as a mix, a hybrid. It functions badly. Haphazard
growth of offices, bloated staff, multiple layers of taxation, surcharges,
scanty public services, widespread nepotism, and corruption are all identified
in the Self-Portrait.
Is it possible to remedy these malfunctions by giving
the politicians more money and more power? That approach risks aggravating the
present situation. Antagonism between politicians and traditional leaders would
surely intensify. In these comments,
therefore, we shall first analyze and evaluate each of the two political
systems that went into the making of Somaliland's hybrid government. That
analysis will tell us whether it is at all possible to mix democracy into the
clan system. If it is not, then attempts to remedy the abysmal performance of
the present hybrid government through reform will be futile. An alternative
will be essential. We shall examine such an alternative.
A Deputy Speaker of Somaliland's parliament told the authors of Self-Portrait, "We need to come up
with a system that accommodates one man one vote, but allows every community (beel)
to be represented. So far, no one has come up with such a formula."
The Deputy Speaker alludes to two different ways of
collective decision-making, one using majority rule and the other consensus.
Majority rule is typical of a democracy, whereas consensus is often used in a
kritarchy. Democracy, the type of
centralized government favored in Europe and America, was invented by the
Greeks some twenty-six centuries ago. As in all centralized government, its
laws are contrived by politicians. Kritarchy, a term composed of the Greek
words kriteis (judge) and archè (principle), is much older than centralized
government. Its laws are derived from the customary conduct of the population.
Customary law generally approximates the laws of social conduct inherent in
human nature. One can therefore say that democracy is based on political law
whereas kritarchy is based on natural law.
Somalis are familiar with both systems. Before being
colonized, the Somalis based their society on respect for their customary law,
which is quite close to natural law. The traditional political system of the
Somalis is a near-kritarchy. In 1960, however, the colonial powers pushed
Somalis to adopt democracy. That system created such a chaotic situation that
few were unhappy when, nine years later, a dictator stepped in to clean things
up. Eventually, however, the Somalis also lost faith in dictatorship. In 1991
they dismantled their European-style government altogether and went back to
their traditional political system based on respect for the customary law.
While democracy and kritarchy each has its
supporters, most Somalis prefer their customary laws and institutions, which
they call xeer. In their experience, the xeer constitutes the
heart of the Somali nation. They believe that without the xeer the Somali nation
would fall apart, lose its identity, forgo its solidarity, forfeit its
civilization, relinquish its culture. The xeer is the cord holding the house
of the Somali people together. Indeed, it is thanks to their customary laws
that the traditional political system of the Somalis took the form of a
kritarchy, not a democracy.
A few Somalis, for the most part politicians, dislike
the xeer.
They prefer democracy. They do so for different reasons. For some it is merely
nostalgia for the "good old days" when they had democracy.
Conveniently, they have forgotten the mess that democracy created during the
1960-1969 period. Certain of them claim the United Nations will not recognize
their republic unless it becomes a democracy. That view is mistaken; the UN
recognizes the United Arab Emirates and the Sultanates of Oman and Brunei, none
of which are democracies. Still other Somali politicians favor democracy
because they want to share in the financial aid that rich democracies seem to
'give' to poor ones. They refuse to see that most such aid is a means of
establishing and maintaining control. Some of the most prominent politicians
favor democracy because it offers them an opportunity to rule over their own
clansmen, or over other clans. Lastly, there are various foreign governments,
international government agencies. and some opportunistic business enterprises.
These urge Somalis to opt for the democratic system because they expect to make
its operators subservient to their own objectives.
Kritarchy is utterly different from democracy. Under
kritarchy, there are no politicians to establish rules and limit other people's
freedoms. Anyone who respects the natural rights of others is free to govern
himself, free to pursue his own objectives with his own means. Kritarchy is the
political system that respects customary law, particularly the right of private
property and freedom of contract. It
embraces the rule of law with its principles by which judges establish the
facts of the disputes brought before
them and resolve these disputes.
One basic feature of kritarchy is that the judicial,
police and law-generating powers are dispersed among the population. Any person
is free to establish a court of justice or a police force. The activities of
judges and policemen are coordinated by the market mechanism instead of by a
supreme court and a police minister. The laws of a kritarchy are discovered by
judges in the course of resolving conflicts that come before them.
A society cannot exist without principles and rules
to handle the problems of knowledge, self-interest and power. That kritarchy
has the best arrangements for coping with these three eternal problems is well
shown by Professor Randy E. Barnett in his book The Structure of Liberty,
Justice and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998). Barnett argues that
only when individuals are secure in their property and free to make contracts
can they make the best use of their resources. For then they can use not only
what they alone know or what is common knowledge much of which is dispersed in
society and comes in the form of prices, but also knowledge they can obtain
contractually from neighbors, experts and others in the community. Kritarchy
also minimizes partiality in the courts and abuses of power by leaving everyone
free to contract with the court of justice and police force of his choice.
Therefore, the closer a society resembles a kritarchy, the better its people
are able to pursue happiness, peace and prosperity for themselves and their
fellow human beings.
Democracy
Democracy belongs to the European tradition of
government, a tradition that, because of its authoritarian nature, is
altogether alien to traditional Somali culture. Democracy became popular in
Europe because it promised to be less authoritarian than the prevailing
monarchies. It promised to dilute the awesome power of a centralized government
by having several teams of politicians periodically compete with each other for
possession of it. The bad thing is that, however the contest turns out, the
population is still divided into two groups, those who command and those who
must obey. By contrast, most of the traditional political systems of Africa
were never authoritarian to begin with.
Democratic governments dispose of truly awesome
powers over the population. These powers are meant to defend every person's
right to life, liberty and property. However, they are regularly used to
restrict those same rights. The politicians can do this with impunity because
they first establish a monopoly over the country's policing powers. A monopoly
over the police enables them to control the legislative process and the courts
of justice. With such control, the politicians can couch their commands in the
form of 'laws' -- rules that have judicial approval and appear to be popularly
mandated. With the backing of these 'laws' the politicians can violate almost
any rights and freedoms. Indeed, democratic 'law' sets the stage for what
sometimes is called the "tyranny of the majority" but really is the
"tyranny of the politicians."
The citizens of a democracy tend to offer little
resistance to this tyranny. They usually hope that the next team of politicians
will correct the mistakes made by the present team. However, democracy's device
for replacing bad politicians with good ones is rarely effective. It is often
rendered ineffective by the development of a two-party system with rival
political programs that are more or less alike. In this way, the two teams
simply take turns in plundering the nation. Other well-known ways of
obstructing popular elections include tinkering with the registration of
voters, limiting the casting of votes, improper counting procedures, and
campaign finance rules that benefit incumbents to the detriment of challengers.
A myriad of measures develops to perpetuate the illusion that democracy
represents the will of the people, hiding the fact that powerful interests
really control the political process.
Democratic elections might work tolerably well in a
society where political parties are based on political programs dealing with
fundamental issues and offering real choices, and where people vote for
programs and not for personalities. However, these conditions are rarely
fulfilled, especially the last one. Most voters tend to ignore political
programs and focus on the personality of the candidates. As a result, the
politicians can freely act over a broad field without any concern that they
will be recalled by the voting population.
Incompatibility
of Democracy with a Clan System
There is one situation in particular where popular
elections will always be ineffective. That is where the population is made up
of a variety of close-knit ethnic groups such as clans, tribes or tight racial,
linguistic or religious communities. In that situation, a voter always casts
his ballot for the same political party, the party to which all people of his
given ethnicity 'belong.' Consequently the most numerous ethnic group will
command the government. The less numerous groups being powerless to change
government policy through the voting process, the only alternatives available
to them are to join a coalition, secede, or seize the power and establish a
dictatorship. Actually, almost any action by opposition parties will provide
the ruling party with a pretext for establishing a dictatorship.
Efforts to prohibit ethnic political parties have
proved futile. Citizens always find ways to express their ethnic loyalties, and
politicians are always tempted to politicize those loyalties. Under such
circumstances there is no economically feasible way that an ethnically neutral
party can attract the attention of the various ethnic communities.
Similarly, it has proved useless to introduce
federalism, regional autonomy, or decentralization, or to limit the number of
parties. These devices may have some value when the population is homogeneous,
but they are useless when the population is divided into close-knit ethnic
groups. All they can possibly do is postpone the inevitable moment when a
dictatorship will be established. Professors Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle
have clearly demonstrated this in their book Politics in Plural Societies: a
Theory of Democratic Instability (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill 1972). Their analysis
leads to the preliminary conclusion that the adoption of democracy in
Somaliland would produce two undesirable results:
Actually, democracy has been unable even to make a
start in Somaliland because the clansmen employed by the government see
themselves neither as servants of the nation nor as assistants to their
ministers. They describe their job as "kursi bu haista" (I
own a chair) and maximize that chair for the benefit of their family and clan.
Knowing that government can forbid anything, they spare no effort in exploiting
that nuisance value. When someone of their own clan asks for a permit they give
it free of charge, but everybody else has to pay dearly. This practice is known
among European nations as abuse of power and corruption. Not so among the
Somalis where it is called hawl fudeydin (that which makes the
job easy).
Somalis have found a way around this problem,
however, by bringing their elders along. This procedure originated as follows.
When two Somalis who belong to different clans meet each other for the first
time, the situation is called hor imaad, a military term that
denotes enmity. That changes when elders accompany both parties. In that case
there is the guarantee that if an injustice is committed it can be promptly
redressed. Indeed, only when, at the first meeting, the elders are present can
a basis for cooperation be established for commerce, marriage, the resolution
of a conflict or whatever. So a Somali who seeks a service from the government
will ask the particular civil servant to bring his elders along. A deal can
then be worked out whereby the civil servants of both clans are obliged to
render equal services to each other's members without charging a fee.
This system works across the whole line of government
activities, including the duties of policemen. The Self-Portrait quotes the mayor of Erigabo who confirms: "If
someone refuses to pay tax, we can't arrest him or her, because that might
divide the police along clan lines." A Somali policeman wishing to arrest
a suspect belonging to another clan must first seek permission of the elders of
that clan. He can obtain that
permission only if his own elders accompany him. Likewise, a clansman can only
be brought before a court of justice if one of his elders is a part of that
court. Similarly, the verdict of a government court can only be enforced if
rendered in accordance with the procedural and substantive laws of the clan of
the convicted person.
“Bizarre
Thing”
The name that the Somalis give to a western-style
government is waxan, which means "the thing." This nuance of
vocabulary shows that there is no place in their mind for a centralized,
monopolized government. They do understand, of course, the three main functions
of a clan, to wit that it recognizes and protects their rights, that it renders
justice when an injustice has been committed, and that it provides social
security. Western-style governments in Africa claim to offer the same three
services. Judging by results, however, they fail in all three areas. Primarily
they engage in plundering the population. Therefore they stand in ill repute.
Calling such governments "a thing" is actually a very polite term.
Somalis say they are devices for "rendering moral what is immoral and
legal what is illegal" (xalaleinta xaramta iyo xeerdarada).
To sum up, it is irrational to suppose that democracy
could ever function in Somaliland. Any attempt to impose it would divide the
population in a small group of powerful rulers and a large group of powerless
citizens. In an egalitarian society like that of the Somalis, such a division
would be totally unacceptable. In their political culture, power always remains
with the people. If it is ever delegated to an executive committee (fulinta
gudiida), it is only for a very specific purpose, with an explicit
instruction from the collective that made the decision, for a short period of
time, and with ample guarantees that the executive will respect the customary
law. These four conditions ensure that no person will put himself above the
law--that no person will put himself above another Somali and order him around.
Creating a
hybrid system
Given that democracy is unworkable in Somaliland and
certainly incompatible with its culture, the politicians promote a notion of
adapting democracy to the local situation. However, they will never concede any
of democracy's basic features, namely, that it must always allow its operators
to:
None of these four features is compatible with the
Somali political culture, according to which all government powers must remain
dispersed among the entire population. This dispersal implies competition, the
opposite of monopoly. In fact, according to Somali law, every Somali is free to
perform services of government. Some people specialize in these services. They are
called odayaal (arbiters, judges). Somali law holds that every person
shall at all times be free to appoint the judge of his choice. That guarantees
competition among judges. This competition in turn guarantees that people get
the service they want, for the lowest possible price.
Mixing competition with monopoly is like mixing water
with fire. The mixture degenerates into a steaming mess. Ignoring this
difficulty, however, politicians have made various proposals to do just that.
One class of proposals for a mixed government stresses the importance of
political parties. But what will these parties be used for? Political parties
are only necessary when all the powers of government have been transferred to
the happy few. A population that accepts political parties implicitly admits
and accepts that:
Another class of proposals for a mixed government
stresses the importance of 'the rule of law.' No word is said about what kind
of law. What the politicians have in mind is to impose laws of their own
devising and give them priority over the customary law.
Yet another way the politicians propose to establish
a mixed government is by putting some of the traditional leaders in parliament.
However, democratic parliaments tend only to legitimize what the government is
doing. Such parliaments would mainly serve to put the population to sleep by
putting feathers in the hats of the traditional leaders.
Politicians who propose these various forms of mixed
government pretend that they are introducing new, even daring political
systems. In reality, such schemes will only paralyze and destroy the
traditional system of governance. A government based on hybrid rules and hybrid
institutions will quickly fall apart into as many sub-groups as there are
ethnic communities. These sub-groups will use their political powers
arbitrarily, creating chaos in the process.
In addition to clashes among the clans, these
attempts at hybrid government will create endless conflicts between the
politicians on the one hand and the ethnic leaders and entrepreneurs on the
other. Politicians will accuse ethnic leaders of encouraging the clans to
sabotage the democracy whereas, in reality, the clansmen simply conduct
themselves as they have done since time immemorial. A mistake many politicians
make is to think that clans are merely families. In reality, a clan is a
complex political, legal and social system enabling Somalis to live together
with a high degree of harmony.
Ethnic leaders are well aware that these attempts at
hybrid governments are gradually but surely destroying the traditional
communities. They regret the loss of respect for the customary laws and
institutions, and they regret the loss of the many good things their
communities achieved through those institutions. Consequently, they despise the
proponents of Western-style government and all the more so when these pose as
saviors of the nation.
Entrepreneurs are the real creators of wealth in any
country. They voluntarily use the inventions and savings of some people to
produce goods and services for other people. They are the real civil servants
of the nation. A successful entrepreneur is someone who rightly guesses what
goods and services people will want. He risks his time and reputation and his
own and other people's money to serve his fellow human beings. When people are
free to invent, save and produce, taking risks for which they alone are
responsible, everyone prospers. Entrepreneurs see African democracies
constantly restricting that freedom. They see politicians everywhere putting
obstacles on the road to their nation's prosperity. Consequently entrepreneurs
in Africa, like the traditional leaders, have nothing but contempt for their
democratic politicians.
In short, it makes no difference whether the plan is
to introduce democracy wholly or only in part. In a clan-based society, it will
inevitably generate poverty, hate, chaos and, eventually, dictatorship.
Republic
of Somaliland
Those who met at the 1993 Grand Borama Conference
chose to create a government for Somaliland that would be a mix of the indigenous
political system and a foreign state system. They entrusted the implementation
of this project to a small group of politicians who would work under the
supervision of a committee of 25 traditional leaders. In so doing, they made
three big mistakes. They did not consider whether it was even possible to mix
these two political systems. They chose politicians who had neither the skill
for the job nor the intention to do as they were instructed. And lastly, they
established no procedure for correcting or removing these politicians in case
they botched their assignment.
From its inception, this hybrid government deviated
from the course that the Conference members had set out:
Harmony: Rather than promoting
harmony and cooperation between the various clans, the new government embraced
policies that engendered animosity and distrust. It gave itself vast powers of
taxation and regulation which led to jealousy and fear. Within a year, civil
war broke out. Some of the rebels felt excluded from the newly created powers,
while others feared that the new powers would supersede those of the clans. The
armed rebellion paused in 1997, but the conflict has not really been settled. Self-Portrait rightly warns that
"throughout the country ... peace remains fragile," and
"perceived regional disparities are the most widely held form of
grievance, and potentially one of the most troublesome."
Administration: Instead
of working in tune with the various clans, the new government put itself above
them and created an administration that went immediately out of control. All
Somaliland needed was a small administration to conduct foreign policy and take
care of defense. Had it limited itself to these two tasks while working in
close cooperation with the clan leaders, the new government might have done
something useful. Instead, it created a vast array of ministries employing
25,000 civil and military servants. Today almost all of its revenue is being
spent on salaries and debt service. Despite this, salaries are minuscule and no
money is left for training. The Somaliland shilling has inflated by more than a
thousand percent. Corruption prevails.
Economic development: Instead
of encouraging economic development, the new government scared off both local
and foreign investors. A poor country, provided it recognizes and protects
property rights, can become rich by attracting and cooperating with foreign
investors. The new government, however, showed no understanding either of
property rights or of investors. It displayed its ignorance through its foolish
Foreign Investment Law and in its day-to-day dealings with both local and
foreign investors. Dictatorial decrees interfere with even the simplest
currency exchange transactions.
Unity: The new government
opposed the dream of a unified Somalia and adopted policies leading to further
splitting of that nation. It was supposed to embrace independence without
forsaking that dream. Yet by seeking United Nations recognition, it showed its
willingness to recognize the political borders of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti,
something all Somalis contest. The correct policy for preserving the
independence of Somalia's clans is to establish a Confederation of Somali
Peoples. Any two or three Somali clans could start such a confederation.
Establishing industrial freeports attractive to foreign investors would then
greatly stimulate the economy of the Confederation's members. Such an economic
stimulus would motivate the other Somali clans in the Horn of Africa to
participate in the Confederation.
Support: Instead of encouraging a
group of intellectuals and politicians who would be supportive of a mixed form
of government, the new government set out to abolish the indigenous structure
and establish a pure democracy. Had the politicians been interested in making
the new mixed government work, they would have given veto powers to its
supervisory committee of traditional leaders. No such powers were given,
however, and consequently the traditional leaders never had any influence on
the Republic. Instead, the new government formed a group of intellectuals and
politicians ready to abolish all of the customary laws and institutions--a
group ready even to establish a dictatorship in order to introduce democracy.
An
Appropriate political system: Confederation of Clans
The Grand Borama Conference intended the experiment
with this hybrid government to last no longer than two years. However, it has
now been going on for eight years. Everyone appears to agree that the
experiment failed, since everyone is looking for alternatives. Three options
are presently being discussed: (1) a purely democratic, European-style
government, (2) a different form of hybrid government, and (3) a solely
clan-based government.
The Self-Portrait
alludes to the proper choice by quoting a spokesman for the Warsangeli suldaan,
who asked, "If clan is indispensable, why should we not base our
functional structures on it and use it for our reconstruction and
development?" He implied that these structures should be founded on the customary
law. This inquiry requires an analysis of this law as well as of the
traditional Somali political system.
Customary
Law and Politics
The Law
The Somali customary laws constitute a legal system (xeer) based on six
principles:
The first of these principles, independence of law
from politics and religion, merits a brief comment. During the past four
centuries, many states have separated religion from government and benefited as
a result. Separation of law and government, on the other hand, is rare. Yet in
other fields besides law, independence from government has had immense success.
A single example is the communications system called the Internet. Until 1973,
that system was monopolized by the United States military. It had relatively
few users. When the military relinquished its monopoly, however, parallel
systems arose in the private sector. These developed rapidly, alongside
university and governmental networks, until the system was owned by no one. As
with language, everyone was free to use and enhance it. Soon, the Internet
started growing at an exponential rate. No one can be denied access to it, and
everyone is free to offer improvements. Open market systems facilitate the
spontaneous development of order without hierarchy or dictatorial authority.
Likewise, the Somali legal system is without any
owner. No one controls it, and everybody has access to it. No politician can
control the xeer and subordinate it to his interests. The xeer
constantly develops and improves, despite the fact that nobody in particular is
in charge of its improvement. Whoever comes up with an innovation that suits
the diverse interests of the community will find his innovation accepted and
put to use.
The xeer has a fairly complete set of
institutions for adjudicating and enforcing the law. It also contains rules of
procedure that guarantee a fair trial. Insurance obligations make it certain
that victims of an injustice will be compensated. As for substantive law, the xeer
recognizes in principle every person's right to life, liberty and property. It
is true that there are some short-comings in the present Somali law, but the
same can be said of every other legal system in the world. By leaving the xeer
free to develop, these shortcomings may be remedied in time. The xeer
contains procedures for this purpose. The Somali legal system has therefore all
the makings for becoming one of the finest legal systems of the world. All it
needs to achieve this status is exposure to the daily hustle-bustle of the
market place of ideas, goods and services.
Politics
The political system of the Somalis consists of a large number of clan-based
assemblies. These meet whenever a political problem arises. Examples are
drought, the search for new grazing lands, the need for a new school, the wish
to prevent a conflict with another clan, and the election of a ceremonial chief
(ugas).
Decisions of these political assemblies must be compatible with the customary
law. To ensure compatibility, the Somalis require that every member of the
assembly agree with the proposed decision. This requirement is known as
"consensus."
Politicians are not allowed to make laws, not even
tax laws--since taxation would be considered a violation of property rights. So
public services can only be supplied by private enterprise. This principle is
based on great wisdom. One only has to look at other African nations to realize
this. Their governments have vast powers to levy taxes. They use these powers
arbitrarily and make no serious effort to provide public services in return.
They use their powers primarily to plunder the nation. As a result, life in
most parts of Africa is "nasty, brutish and short."
For all of these reasons we have come to the
conclusion that the political and legal system most suited to the Somali
political culture is the traditional Somali form of organization. The main
characteristic of that system is that it is based on customary law and, as a
rule, protects the life, liberty and property of the people. It is well
established and respected. Its main problem has been not that it has some
weaknesses, but that the promoters of centralized government have constantly
interfered with it.
Opponents
of the clan system
Many Somali politicians oppose the clan system. The Self-Portrait voices this sentiment by
stating that "kinship politics provide fertile soil for patronage,
corruption, nepotism and clientelism, while stifling the emergence of
issue-based politics, meritocracy and professionalism." However, it is not
the clan system that produces all these calamities, but the democracy that
politicians are trying to put in its place. Democracy is a form of centralized
government. As such it puts awesome powers into the hands of a few clansmen,
and that turns the clans into monsters that try to devour each other. This
would never happen if the clans were left alone. Within their traditional
political system, the clans are perfectly capable of maintaining law and order
(xeer)
so that there can be peace and prosperity (nabad iyo ano).
Had the politicians had the interests of the Somali
nation at heart, they would not have tried, with one stroke of the pen, to
abolish the political and cultural system that took a millennium to shape.
Neither would they have tried to mix the traditional governing approach with a
foreign system. Instead, they would have respected the traditional structure
and facilitated its improvement by strengthening the procedures already in
place for this purpose.
The irony of their proposal to displace traditional
government with democracy is that it has resulted in a tightening of clan
loyalties. Somalis look at democracy as the enemy of their freedom and
equality. Clan law offers an excellent defense against attacks on these
fundamental values. Somalis therefore will do everything to strengthen their
clan system when confronted with democratic features like political parties,
tax laws, and the regulation of peaceful conduct.
Blinded by their desire for power, the politicians do
not see that if the clan system is left alone, its least desirable aspects will
soon disappear. The happy modification of the clan system cannot occur while it
is being condemned and reviled, but only when it is accepted and embraced. One
result of embracing the clan system will be that the business environment will
become conducive to the growth of independent insurance companies. The
important services that clans now provide in insuring against liability and
calamity will devolve upon these independent companies. Much litigation and
many of the present protections against disaster will thus be subsumed into a
market economy, with attendant innovations and cost reduction. As a result,
individuals will depend less on their clan for support. Loyalty to clan and
culture will become independent of every person's pursuit of individual
prosperity, allowing real improvements in the clan system to take place.
A standard politician's criticism of the traditional
system is that it is incapable of modern administration. In plain language, the
politicians insist that public services such as schools, hospitals, and roads
cannot be provided by the traditional Somali political system. That criticism
dissolves under the splendid light of the market economy. The private sector
provides better schools, better health care, and more useful roads. Indeed, all
so-called public services are best rendered by private enterprise.
There are at least three reasons for the superiority
of the private sector. First, governments lack the information needed to render
effective service. The necessary information is dispersed among the population,
who are best able to express their interests through the market approach of
price seeking, quality seeking, and choice seeking behaviors.
Second, governments waste enormous wealth by funding
services through taxation. For every shilling that is collected in taxes, five
to seven shillings are destroyed, wasted, or prevented from being created
(James Gwartney and Robert Lawson, Economic
Freedom of the World, 1997 Annual
Report, Fraser Institute, Vancouver) The market mechanism for allocating
resources to create new services is flexible and efficient, whereas the
government mechanism is barely effective at all.
Third, in the process of rendering public services,
governments demand certain behaviors while forbidding others. Such orders are
hard to tolerate. They are made even less bearable by reason of their poor
results. Most people respect the rights of others and regret the government
ordering them about. A common result of this is that people cooperate in
fooling the government and opposing its orders. Tax avoidance and evasion,
black markets for exchanges forbidden by government, and open flaunting of both
mandatory and prohibited behavior creates an environment that is not conducive
to the effective rendering of public services.
For every public service that can be imagined,
instances can be found somewhere in the world where it is being supplied by
private enterprise, to the great satisfaction of its users. Critics of private
enterprise usually shrug this off because they have so many other grudges. They
maintain, for instance, that the market mechanism has weaknesses that need
correction by the government mechanism. They say nothing about the weaknesses
of the government mechanism, which is much more fraught with defects than the
market mechanism. Critics of private enterprise also maintain that democratic
governments can be useful, for instance
to defend the poor against the rich. However, this hypothesis has never
been substantiated. Democracy tends to benefit those who are politically
organized at the expense of those who are not as well organized. Indeed,
democracy offers some the opportunity to be parasites on all others. The lucky
ones in the democratic wheel of fortune are those who pay the right price to
the right politicians. Under democracy, those with the least ability to pay
suffer most.
When politicians field all these arguments against
the clan system, it is not really the clans but the customary law they want to
destroy. They correctly perceive that customary law forms an obstacle on their
road to consolidating power over their countrymen. The customary law subjects
the nation's leaders to the same laws as everyone else. Indeed, the
compensation they must pay for a given misdeed is more than others would have
to pay. The leader who steals must pay his victim not only compensation for what was stolen, but an additional
amount because he flaunted the very rules he was supposed to enforce. Under
democratic law, on the other hand,
the politicians set themselves apart with concepts of sovereign immunity,
executive privilege, and constitutional authority, distorting the very system
they extol.
Precedents
for Confederation
Examples of confederations that have proven
successful include the United Arab Emirates and the confederated cantons of
Switzerland. Even countries that have become mired in the difficulties and
contradictions of democracy often owe much of their success to features of
confederation that were embedded in their initial configuration. The United
States was originally organized under a set of articles of confederation that included many of the
principles that work so well in the Emirates and Switzerland. Where these
principles survive, people prosper.
The concept of confederation acknowledges that
populations that are ethnically, culturally, or linguistically diverse cannot
be expected to thrive under consolidated authority. In the Swiss canton system,
the principle of one man, one vote is replaced by one man, many votes. Every
Swiss person expresses his political authority in a local community, in a
canton or region, and in the nation as a whole. An enormous diversity of political
approaches are used in the dozens of cantons and half-cantons, and even more
diversity is available in the hundreds of different communities. This diversity
doesn't promote chaos, but instead promotes best solutions. Essential to making
it work is the freedom of movement that allows people to quit communities and
cantons with ineffective policies and move to neighboring towns and regions
that are better organized.
Switzerland is enormously prosperous despite its
small population, few mineral resources, and extremely rugged terrain. The
history of its system of cooperating cantons with extremely limited central
authority arose not in recent years, but in the first glimmerings of the
Renaissance about 1290 AD. The unsophisticated and much more tribal Swiss of
that era recognized the opportunity for competing cantons to cooperate in
mutual defense.
Even though the different cantons of Switzerland have
different languages, different religious traditions, and vastly different
cultures, they are nonetheless able to cooperate successfully. They do so by
vesting power in the individual, in the community, in the region, and in the
nation, in that order. The individual militia members are armed against both
tyranny within the country and potential enemies outside the country. The
communities are organized according to principles that work locally and
therefore may differ enormously from town to town. The various communities
decide how the limited powers of the confederate government will be used. In
short, the Swiss have severely limited the powers of their government.
A similar set of ideas underpins the United Arab
Emirates. Each emirate has local authority over matters of economics and law.
The emirates cooperate for foreign policy and defense. By limiting central
authority to minimal functions, enormous efficiencies are obtained. These real
world examples show that the principles of decentralized authority work not
only in theory, but also in practice.
Implementation
Somaliland basically has three options to pursue:
dictatorship, democracy, or kritarchy. If it wishes to prosper, it must stop
experimenting with hybrid political systems and choose a political system that
suits the Somali way of life
A decision in favor of kritarchy would imply
abandoning the present provisional constitution as well as plans for
establishing political parties. A good way of dismantling the present hybrid
government would be to let each clan take care of that government's rights,
obligations and belongings that it finds on its territory. In this way, no sudden changes occur and
continuity of useful operations is assured.
In the mind of Somalis, independence does not mean
that each clan will live on a political island. Already today, the clans
maintain a set of rules that enable them to deal with each other in a civilized
manner, just as most of the hundreds of nations in the world respect certain
rules of international law when dealing one with another. An essential rule of
the Somali political system is that every person has an inalienable right to
move freely throughout the Somali-speaking realm. This rule, which had such a
beneficial effect on the Swiss nation, lets the individual person vote with his
feet, moving his family to places where there are different policies and opportunities.
Eventually, a Guurti, a council or assembly of
elders, should be formed to establish a Confederation of Somali Peoples. Most
of Somaliland's clans will surely agree to become its initial members.
Gradually the others will join, including those located in Kenya, Ethiopia and
Djibouti. These clans will become interested as soon as Somaliland's economy
starts to develop. Many foreign and local investors have already manifested
their intention to establish business ventures in Somaliland. They will not
start, however, as long as there remains a hybrid government. They are waiting
for the moment when the customary law once again will rule supreme.
The founding charter of such a Somali confederation
should avoid the term "territory." Rather, the Confederation should
be a political organization without a territory, somewhat like the United
Nations. In that way, the central governments of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti
will not perceive the Confederation as a threat to the integrity of their
territories. The Confederation need not worry about negotiating free movement
across the borders of these countries. Even the most powerful central
government cannot prevent migrating economic actors from crossing its borders.
Business people are usually very skilled, and in any event more motivated than
the politicians, to promote the free movement of ideas, people, and
merchandise. They will be much more effective than the politicians in removing obstacles to free trade in the
cross-border economy.
Foreign governments and their international agencies
would be well advised to leave the Somalis alone. By trying to establish a
consolidated federal state among the Somalis they promote the continuing
impoverishment of the Somali people.
It took two thousand years for more than four dozen European nations to
consolidate in a confederation, which even today is the subject of mass
protests and demonstrations. It would be folly indeed for European politicians
to insist on the consolidation of five dozen Somali clans within one decade.
They have no moral authority whatever to teach the Somalis how to unite, in
view of the history of total warfare, mass exterminations, and brutality in
Europe in the twentieth century alone. Even were we to concede that the
European approach to problems of confederation and political union works in
Europe, it would stretch credulity to suppose that it could be applied
overnight in an altogether different cultural setting.
Conclusion
The Self-Portrait
has made it abundantly clear that the Somalis are deeply attached to their
traditional form of government. In addition, it demonstrates beyond any doubt
that the hybrid government formed in 1993 has gone totally out of control. The
authors of the Self-Portrait did not
endeavor to find the causes for these two phenomena. They left that task to its
readers. The present memorandum has endeavored to seek and find those causes.
We have found that the Somalilanders value their
traditional political, legal and social system not because it is based on
kinship, but because its rules are based on custom rather than on political
whim. The strength of Somali law derives from two features in particular. One
is that it recognizes every person's right to life, liberty and property. The
other is that it offers politicians no opportunities to influence the law. It
is worth noting that under this legal system, the Somali nation has become one
of the most numerous in Africa.
Kinship will always remain a vital factor in the life
of an individual. However, its prominence in social, legal, and political
structures will diminish over time as more effective approaches become
available. The day will come when Somalis will entrust most of their legal
affairs to independent insurance companies. As a result, their dependence on
clans to insure against liability and calamity will decrease. On the other
hand, their high regard for their customary laws and institutions is bound to
grow without limit. Already today, Somalis consider their customary law system
to be vital to the cohesion, well being and prosperity of their society.
As for Somaliland's hybrid government, we found that
it failed because the Grand Borama Conference attempted to mix two contrasting
systems, a command society and a free society. As a practical matter,
consolidated power cannot be stopped halfway. When a politician is given one
finger, he takes your whole hand. He is like a camel in a sandstorm; once his
nose enters your tent and he finds the wind is not blowing in there, the rest
of him will follow.
The difficulties that arose from this hybrid system
were not foreseen, and no blame should attach to its failure. As the problems
became apparent, the people tried to reverse course, though with only limited
success. Learning from the mistakes of the past is the source of wisdom.
Somaliland's decision to create a hybrid government
was fully in keeping with all the other state-building experiments the Somali
nation has had to suffer through since the end of World War II. What these
state-building experiments have had in common is that they all ignored the
rules of social conduct inherent in human nature, the principles known
collectively as "the customary law." The consequence of that fatal
oversight was that the politicians destroyed the nation. The lesson to be learned from this is that any true nation
building effort in Somaliland must not attempt to create a central government,
but rather must strengthen the customary law system so that natural rights are
more respected and the rule of law becomes fully operational.
The Self-Portrait
correctly observes that whatever wealth was created during the past eight years
was created by private enterprise. It indicates that much more wealth would
have been created had the government followed more sensible policies. If
Somaliland is to move forward into freedom and prosperity, it must now put a
stop to efforts to establish a democratic state, which can only further disrupt
property rights and frustrate entrepreneurial incentive. Somalilanders should
now give their full support to the traditional system that is already in place
and that has evolved over the centuries. In this system, control vests
primarily in the individual, secondarily in his jilib (sub-clan), thirdly
in his clan, and finally in the cluster of clans now called Somaliland. This
cluster could take the form of a limited confederation whose only activity
would be to conduct foreign policy and coordinate military defense. In this
system, each individual speaks for himself, defends himself and his family, and
exercises authority over his own interests. Each clan speaks for itself and
exercises authority over its interests. Each village or town attends to the
common needs of the clans residing there. Each region attends only to the
common needs of its villages or towns. The confederation, finally, should have
no other task than to conduct foreign policy and joint military operations.
Only in this way will Somalilanders come into full
technological, scientific, economic, and cultural participation in the modern
world. Americans owe their prosperity to having begun as a confederation and
having continued for many years thereafter with a decentralized system. The
result will be the same in Somaliland
if its people follow their own traditions and allow them room to grow.
Peace, prosperity and stability will follow from a decentralized approach as
morning follows the dawn.
Once its traditional structure is revitalized
Somaliland will begin developing.
Its customary laws and institutions will become more prominent, its
economy will start growing, and the
political relations among its clans will become more structured. By achieving
these objectives for themselves, Somalilanders will set the stage for peace and prosperity
throughout the entire Somali nation.
A
Self-Portrait of Somaliland: Rebuilding from the Ruins is an eighty-seven
page report published in December 1999 by the Somaliland Centre for Peace and
Development. The Centre is an offshoot of the War-torn Societies Project that
came in 1995 to Somalia under the auspices of the Geneva-based UN Research
Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) The text of the report is here.
Page Copyright ©
2001 Frank Douglas Heath heathfdn@sierra.net
All Rights
Reserved. Published with permission.